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Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by 
Directors with Multiple Board Appointments 
STEPHEN P. FERRIS, MURALI JAGANNATHAN, and A.C. PRITCHARD* 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. 
Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to 
attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that 
firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by 
a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibil- 
ities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are 
associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude 
that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an 
individual. 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS criticize firms for appointing 
directors who hold directorships in multiple companies, contending that such di- 
rectors are incapable of effectively monitoring the management of so many firms. 
Informed observers such as ChancellorWilliam Allen (1992) of the Delaware Court 
of Chancery argue that "effective monitoring requires a commitment of time and 
resources ... The demands of the position, if properly understood, are inconsistent 
in my opinion, with service on an impressively long list of boards (p. 457)" 
Corporate governance activists echo these criticisms and propose specific lim- 
its to deal with the perceived problem. The Council of Institutional Investors 
(1998) argues that in the absence of unusual and highly specific circumstances, 
directors with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two other boards. The 
National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) is more lenient, suggesting 
that directors with full-time positions should not serve on more than three or 
four other boards. The Business Roundtable (1997), by contrast, believes that lim- 
its on the number of directorships are ill advised. 
Directors themselves disagree over the issue of multiple directorships. The 
most commonly shared complaint among directors, according to Lipton and 
*Ferris is from the College of Business, University of Missouri-Columbia, Jagannathan is 
from the School of Management, Binghamton University-SUNY, and Pritchard is from the 
Law School, University of Michigan. This paper has benefited from the helpful comments 
and suggestions of Merritt Fox, Richard Lempert, Anil Makhija, Ronald Mann, Mark West, 
seminar participants at the University of Michigan, University of Missouri-Columbia, Vander- 
bilt University, and the American Law and Economics Association and the Financial Man- 
agement Association annual meetings. Pritchard acknowledges financial support from the 
Cook Fund of the University of the Michigan Law School. The authors alone are responsible 
for this work and any errors or omissions. 
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Lorsch (1992), is insufficient time for the discharge of their professional responsi- 
bilities. A survey of directors of Fortune 500 companies by Korn/Ferry Interna- 
tional (1998) finds that many directors believe too many board appointments 
place an excessive burden on a director. Fifty-six percent of outside directors re- 
port that they declined an invitation to serve on an additional board, with the 
majority citing a lack of time as their reason for refusal. These directors evidently 
believe that too many board assignments might dissipate their time and atten- 
tion, thereby undermining their ability to monitor management. That same 
study also finds that an overwhelming majority of directors believe that 
CEOs and other inside directors should be limited in the number of boards to 
which they are appointed, but directors were evenly divided on whether limits 
should be placed on outside directors. Thus, whether holding multiple director- 
ships impairs an individual director's ability to monitor management has be- 
come a controversial topic that has spawned proposals for governance reform. 
Despite this controversy, very little research has been done concerning the ef- 
fect of multiple directorships on corporate performance. Our study tests the hy- 
pothesis that directors who serve on multiple boards become so busy that they 
cannot monitor management adequately. What we call the Busyness Hypothesis 
of corporate directorships postulates that serving on multiple boards overcom- 
mits an individual. As a consequence, such individuals shirk their responsibil- 
ities as directors. For example, overcommitted directors might serve less 
frequently on important board committees such as the audit or the compensation 
committees. If boards play an important role in firm performance, the implica- 
tion of the Busyness Hypothesis is that the presence of multiple directors on a 
firm's board reduces oversight of management and, as a result, the firm's market 
value. Additionally, reduced monitoring by these busy directors might exacer- 
bate other forms of agency costs, such as increased litigation exposure for the 
firm. 
Our principal findings are as follows. Examining the market for directors, we 
find that the past performance of firms for which an individual serves as a direc- 
tor correlates with the number of directorships subsequently held by that indivi- 
dual, a result we call the reputation effect. When we test the Busyness Hypothesis 
in a multivariate framework, we find no evidence that multiple board appoint- 
ments harm subsequent firm performance. 
Additional tests confirm this result. An event study of firms announcing the 
appointment of a multiple director finds that firms announcing the appointment 
of a multiple director for the first time experience significantly positive abnormal 
returns. Comparing committee service by multiple directors with that of non- 
multiple directors, we find that multiple directors serve on more committees 
and attend more committee meetings. Such a result is inconsistent with shirking 
by multiple directors. Finally, we find no relation between the number of director- 
ships and the likelihood of securities fraud litigation against the firm. Overall, 
we conclude that our findings do not support the Busyness Hypothesis. 
We organize this study into six sections. In Section I, we discuss the prior lit- 
erature relating to the market for directors and multiple directorships. In Sec- 
tion II, we discuss our data and methods, and we describe the characteristics of 
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multiple directors in Section III. In Section IV, we examine the relation between 
the firm's previous performance and the number of directorships held by its direc- 
tors as well as the likelihood that a director will add an additional board appoint- 
ment. Section V presents the results of our tests of the Busyness Hypothesis. 
Section VI concludes with a brief summary. 
I. The Market for Directorships and the Influence of Directors on Firm 
Performance 
Some scholars argue that the market for directors serves shareholder inter- 
ests. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that multiple board appointments can sig- 
nal director quality. The appointment to numerous boards might be the result of 
the superior performance enjoyed earlier by the firm for which the individual 
serves as a director or as an executive. If the market for directors is linked to 
corporate performance, firm success can generate additional offers of board em- 
ployment. Following Fama and Jensen, Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), 
and Vafeas (1999) suggest that the number of directorships held by a director 
might proxy for reputational capital, with such individuals viewed as high qual- 
ity directors. Moreover, service on multiple boards can provide a director with a 
greater diversity of experience. 
Related research shows that poor performance is punished in the market for 
directors. Gilson (1990) finds that outside directors who leave the boards of finan- 
cially distressed firms hold approximately one-third fewer directorships three 
years after their departure. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that top executives 
of firms that reduce dividends are 50 percent less likely to obtain additional di- 
rectorships. Similarly, Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) report that the number of 
board seats held by retiring CEOs is related to firm performance prior to their 
retirement. Shivdasani (1993) observes that outside directors of firms that are 
the targets of hostile bids are likely to hold fewer directorships than directors 
of nontarget firms. If firms become targets due to poor performance, Shivdasani's 
findings lend additional support to Fama and Jensen's (1983) argument. In sum, 
these studies suggest that directors of underperforming firms suffer from tarn- 
ished reputations in the market for directors. 
Other factors might influence the number of directorships held by an indivi- 
dual. Booth and Deli (1995) argue that larger firms have wider contracting envir- 
onments, requiring negotiations with more parties. The increased level of 
business transactions resulting from these contracts can create a greater oppor- 
tunity for offers of additional board memberships. Multiple directorships permit 
the firm to use its directors to form or solidify advantageous contracting relations 
with other firms, such as important suppliers or customers. An alternative argu- 
ment for a relation between firm size and the number of directorships held per 
director is that directors of large firms might be attractive as candidates for 
other boards because of the networking contacts they represent to these firms. 
In addition, directors of large firms might be perceived as more skilled because 
of the size and complexity of the operations they oversee. 
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Certain scholars are more skeptical that the market for directors serves share- 
holder interests. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Shivdasani and Yer- 
mack (1999) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when serving on 
multiple boards, rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial mon- 
itoring. Managers subject to lax monitoring might be able to impose greater 
agency costs on the firm, with a consequent reduction in firm performance and 
value. The empirical work of these scholars offers some support to the Busyness 
Hypothesis. 
Core et al. (1999) report that the presence of directors holding multiple ap- 
pointments correlates with excess CEO compensation, implying that such direc- 
tors serve as an inadequate check on management. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) also provide evidence that questions the independence of directors who 
hold multiple appointments. They report that directors with multiple director- 
ships are more likely to be chosen for an additional board seat if the CEO of the 
firm is involved in the director selection process. This evidence suggests that di- 
rectors holding multiple appointments cater to CEOs, implying that their moni- 
toring of management does little to reduce agency costs. If this is correct, the 
market for directors might be geared toward ensuring a compliant board for the 
CEO, rather than representing shareholder interests. 
Other evidence, however, suggests that multiple directors are associated 
with firm success. Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) find that the presence of directors 
holding multiple directorships was strongly related to firm performance in 
the cotton spinning industry in Japan during the first decade of the 20th 
century. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) document that shareholders re- 
ceive larger premiums in tender offers when the board includes multiple direc- 
tors. Finally, Brown and Maloney (1999) find that firms enjoy superior returns 
from acquisitions when they have directors who hold multiple directorships. 
These studies suggest that multiple directorships are consistent with 
shareholder interests. Whether the results of these studies can be gene- 
ralized, however, is open to question, given their specialized settings and circum- 
stances. 
II. Data and Methods 
A. Sample Construction 
The primary sample that we examine in this study consists of those firms on 
COMPUSTAT with at least $100 million in total assets at the beginning of 1995. 
We are able to obtain proxy statements for 2,002 of these firms, from which we 
obtain directors' names, age, individual director's equity ownership, board own- 
ership, board tenure, professional affiliation, and independence. We obtain direc- 
tors' names, age, and the boards ownership for an additional 1,188 firms from 
Compact Disclosure. This produces a final sample of 3,190 firms. The various mea- 
sures of directorships held by individual directors used in this study only include 
appointments to the boards of our sample firms. This constraint is necessary to 
allow us to examine firm-level accounting and financial data, which we obtain 
1090 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Mon, 04 May 2015 15:01:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Too Busy to Mind the Business? 
from COMPUSTAT. The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 
provides equity return time-series data. 
B. Measurement of Multiple Directorships 
For each firm, we calculate several different measures of multiple director- 
ships. Each measure is calculated at the level of the firm's board, thereby allowing 
us to match firm-level data with these measures of multiple directorships. The 
first, directorships per director, measures, for a given firm, the average number 
of sample firm directorships held by the directors of that firm. The second mea- 
sure is the maximum number of directorships held by any one member of a firm's 
board. Our third measure is the percentage of directors on a board who hold 
three or more directorships. 
We calculate two additional measures of multiple directorships to provide a 
more particularized assessment of the effect of director business on the firm. To 
focus on external monitoring, our fourth measure is the average number of direc- 
torships held by the outside directors1 of a given firm. Because the potential dis- 
traction of multiple directorships might be more of a problem for firms that 
employ these potentially overstretched individuals as officers, our final measure 
is the maximum number of directorships held by any executive of the firm (in 
practice, usually the CEO).2 We include board chairs as executives in calculating 
this measure because many chairmen who do not hold titles as officers nonethe- 
less receive salaries, suggesting that they are full-time employees of the firm. 
III. Characteristics of Directors Holding Multiple Appointments 
A. The Incidence of Multiple Directorships 
In Panel A of Table I, we report data regarding the frequency of multiple board 
directorships for our sample in 1995.3 We immediately observe that multiple di- 
rectorships are not the norm. Only 16 percent of all directors hold two or more 
board seats. Even less common, at approximately 6 percent of the sample of total 
directorships, are directors holding three or more directorships-the limit pro- 
posed by the Council of Institutional Investors. For those directors (hereafter 
"multiple directors"), the directorships they hold are heavily skewed toward the 
largest firms in our sample. We find that multiple directors hold approximately 
half of their directorships in Forbes 500 firms.We conclude that multiple director- 
ships are primarily a large-firm phenomenon. 
1We include in this category all directors who are not currently employed by the firm. 2 In calculating variables related to executives, we take data related to the executive with 
the highest number of directorships. In the event of a tie between two or more executives, we 
focus on the highest ranking, that is, chair over CEO, CEO over CFO, and so forth. Because 
the CEO is most commonly the individual with the greatest number of directorships, we refer 
to the variables related to this executive as "CEO" for ease of exposition. 3 These statistics are calculated at the level of the individual director, rather than the board 
level. 
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Table I 
Patterns in the Number of Directorships Held by Directors 
Panel A presents the numbers of directors for our sample firms, classified by the number of di- 
rectorships held. The sample consists of those firms on Compustat with at least $100 million in 
total assets at the beginning of 1995 for which we have director data from either corporate proxy 
statements or Compact Disclosure. We calculate the number of directorships held for any indivi- 
dual director using only directorships held in this sample of firms. Panel B contains the mean 
(median) for various measures of directorships held. Directorships per director is estimated as 
the total number of directorships held by the directors of a board divided by board size. The 
maximum number of directorships held is the largest number of total directorships held by 
any director on a specific board. The percentage of directors holding three or more director- 
ships is the number of directors holding three or more total appointments divided by board size. 
Directorship per outside director is the mean number of directorships held by the outside direc- 
tors of the firm. This variable assumes a value of zero if the firm does not have any outside direc- 
tors on its board. The maximum number of directorships held by an executive is the largest 
number of total directorships held by a director on the board who is also an executive of the firm 
(including the chairman of the board). 
Panel A: Directors by Number of Directorships 
Fraction of 
Directorships Number of Fraction of Fraction of Directorships in 
Held Directors Directors Total Directorships Forbes 500 firms 
1 19,978 84.39 67.60 18.51 
2 2,383 10.07 16.13 33.74 
3 767 3.24 7.79 46.59 
4 351 1.48 4.75 50.71 
5 115 0.49 1.95 59.48 
6 47 0.20 0.95 49.65 
7 17 0.07 0.40 59.66 
8 10 0.04 0.27 68.75 
9 3 0.01 0.09 37.04 
10 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 2 0.01 0.07 63.64 
Total directors 23,673 5,979 
Total directorships 29,554 7,721 
Number of firms 3,190 653 
Panel B: Means (Medians) for Alternative Measures of Multiple Directorships 
Maximum Number Percentage of Directorships Maximum Number 
Directorships of Directorships Directors with Three per Outside of Directorships 
per Director Held or More Directorships Director Held by an Executive 
1.600 3.12 14.97 1.89 1.91 
(1.40) (3) (9.09) (1.70) (1) 
In Panel B, we present alternative measures of multiple directorships. The 
mean (median) of directorships per director is 1.60 (1.40), the maximum number 
of directorships held by any director of a firm has a mean (median) of 3.12 (3.00), 
while the percentage of directors holding three or more directorships has a mean 
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(median) of 14.97 percent (9.09 percent).4 When we focus on the outside directors 
and the executives who serve on the board, we find that the means are quite simi- 
lar for the two categories (1.89 directorships per outside director, 1.91 for the max- 
imum number of directorships held by an executive), although the median is 
higher for the outside directors measure (1.70 and 1, respectively). 
B. Professional Affiliations of Directors 
We examine the professional affiliations of directors in Table II. We collect this 
demographic data from corporate proxy statements. Not surprisingly, current 
and former corporate executives are the largest source of directors, accounting 
for over 56 percent of the directors with one or two directorships and 62 percent 
of the multiple directors. Executives from large Forbes 500 firms are much more 
likely to be multiple directors than their counterparts from smaller firms, sug- 
gesting that the experience of running a major company leads to more offers of 
directorships than experience running smaller firms. Among other groups, ven- 
ture capitalists stand out as frequent multiple directors, perhaps reflecting own- 
ership interests or perceived expertise in firm monitoring. 
C. Director and Firm Characteristics 
In Table III, we continue our univariate analysis of the characteristics of multi- 
ple board memberships. We compare firms with multiple directors with firms 
whose directors hold only one or two directorships. 
The firm characteristics that we compare include several sets of possible deter- 
minants of the number of board appointments. The first set focuses on the de- 
mands imposed by directorships: Whether directorships are held in a single 
industry5 and whether directorships are held in large firms which we proxy by 
inclusion on the Forbes 500 list. The second set includes important financial char- 
acteristics: firm size (total assets), the firm's growth potential (market-to-book 
ratio), and profitability (operating margin). The final set includes director and 
board characteristics: average age of the directors, equity ownership by the en- 
tire board, equity ownership by the outside directors, board size, and the percen- 
tage of outside directors. 
C.1. Financial Characteristics 
We find that multiple directorships are associated with larger firms as mea- 
sured by total assets at the beginning of 1995. This result is consistent with the 
view that larger firms have more external contracting relationships than smaller 
companies and hence greater opportunity for gain from the well-bonded relation- 
ships likely to result from external directorships. It is also consistent, however, 
4 Although not reported separately, we find that the correlation between these three mea- 
sures is high (ranging from 0.79 to 0.93). Given such a high correlation, our alternative mea- 
sures of multiple directorships unsurprisingly produce similar results. Accordingly, we 
tabulate only the directorships per director measure for our multivariate regressions. 
5For individuals holding three or more directorships, industry directors are defined as 
holding at least 50 percent of their directorships within the same two-digit SIC code. 
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Table II 
Professional Affiliation of Sample Directors by Directorships Held 
A director is considered to be a multiple director if he/she holds three or more directorships in the sample firms. Because of data availability, 
information about director affiliation is restricted to those firms for which 1995 corporate proxy statements are available. Commercial and invest- 
ment banker directors includes individuals identified on the proxy statements as commercial and investment bankers, as well as investment advi- 
sors, insurance company directors, and other financial directors. Consultant directors consist of consultants, attorneys, and accountants. Venture 
capitalist and Forbes 500 executive directors are limited to individuals so identified on the proxy statements. Other executive directors consist of 
executives of non-Forbes 500 sample firms and former executives. The other directors classification consists of advertisers, suppliers, elected and 
government officials, educators, military officers, executives of nonprofit organizations, relatives, and individuals with no primary occupation. 
Directors of firms for which these proxies are unavailable are classified as unknown. Statistical significance at the five and one percent levels is 
indicated by ** and ***, respectively. 
Directors with One or Two Directorships Multiple Directors Difference in Proportion 
Primary Professional Affiliation Number of Directors Row Percent Number of Directors Row Percent Chi-Square 
Commercial and investment bankers 1497 89.16 182 10.84 96.88*** 
Venture capitalists 185 84.86 33 15.14 38.70*** 
Consultants 1922 94.41 114 5.59 0.01 
Forbes 500 executives 1335 81.70 299 18.29 545.58*** 
Other executives 6166 92.31 513 7.68 81.29*** 
Other 2090 92.93 159 7.07 4.67** 
Unknown 9166 99.87 12 0.13 838.47*** 
Total 22,361 94.46 1312 5.54 
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Table III 
Comparative Characteristics of Firms with and without Multiple 
Directors 
Table III compares the means (medians) of firm and board characteristics of firms between firms 
with and without multiple directors. A director is considered a multiple director if he/she holds 
three or more directorships in the sample firms. All financial variables are calculated as of fis- 
cal year-end 1994. Industry directors are defined as individuals holding three or more director- 
ships with at least 50 percent of their directorships held in firms having the same two-digit SIC 
code. Directorships per director in Forbes 500 firms is the mean number of directorships held by 
a director in Forbes 500 firms. The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of firm 
equity plus the book value of preferred stock plus the book value of debt to the total value of 
assets. Operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets. Total assets 
are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Corporate governance data is obtained from the 
firms' proxies for the 1995 proxy season. Board size is firm's total number of directors, while 
board ownership is the percent of the firm's total outstanding equity held by the firm's directors. 
Outside director ownership is percent of total equity held by outside directors. Thirty firms with 
boards of three or less are not included in this analysis due to incomplete information. Statis- 
tical significance at the one percent level is indicated by *** 
Firms without Firms with 
a Multiple a Multiple t-statistic 
Characteristic Director Director (Wilcoxon z) 
Number of firms 1449 1711 
Number of firms with industry directors 291 
Directorships per director in Forbes 500 firms 0.82 0.80 34.44** 
(0) (0.44) (38.1)*** 
Total assets 832.12 5214.89 10.23*** 
(306.39) (793.12) (18.61)*** 
Market-to-book 1.87 2.43 9.91*** 
(1.47) (2.02) (12.99)*** 
Operating margin 9.61 14.56 12.12*** 
(5.13) (13.87) (14.66)*** 
Average Age 57.01 58.07 5.79*** 
(57.28) (58.59) (5.74)*** 
Board Ownership 23.59 17.86 7.03** 
(16.29) (7.40) (11.41)*** 
Outside Directors Ownership 5.84 5.42 0.60 
(1.08) (0.64) 3.42*** 
Board Size 8.51 10.37 14.95*** 
(8) (10) (15.94)*** 
Percent Outside Directors 17.61 32.84 17.62 ** 
(16.67) (33.33) (15.48)*** 
with the view that directors and executives of large firms are perceived to possess 
desirable abilities resulting from their oversight of a major corporation. 
To analyze firm value, we employ both market and accounting-based measures. 
We use the firm's market-to-book ratio and the firm's operating profit margin. We 
explicitly include an accounting based measure of performance because man- 
agers are often provided incentives to respond to accounting figures rather than 
more conventional market benchmarks (Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1985), Ga- 
ver, Gaver, and Battistel (1992), and Kumar and Sopariwala (1992)). 
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The differences between firms on these measures are generally statistically sig- 
nificant. Most notably, firms with multiple directors are more highly valued as 
measured by the market-to-book ratio. Firms with multiple directors also enjoy 
higher operating profit margins.6 
Overall, we believe that these comparisons are consistent with the contention 
of Fama and Jensen (1983) that multiple directorships relate positively to firm 
performance. These simple comparisons do not, however, indicate the direction 
of causation between firm performance and a board appointment. If the market 
for directors works efficiently, the best directors should receive the greatest num- 
ber of offers to serve as a director. These quality directors might generate higher 
levels of performance from the firm. Alternatively, Bhagat and Black (1999) argue 
that more successful firms are able to attract directors who serve on multiple 
boards. We explore the nature of this relation between multiple directorships 
and firm performance in greater detail in Sections IVand V. 
C.2. Corporate Governance Characteristics and Agency Costs 
Given the fees and prerogatives associated with board membership, an agency 
cost view of multiple board affiliations hypothesizes them as a form of perquisite 
consumption. The Busyness Hypothesis implies that multiple board member- 
ships might reflect organizational slack due to agency conflict: Directors over- 
commit themselves at the expense of shareholders because they enjoy the 
prestige and fees associated with sitting on numerous boards. Reduced monitor- 
ing by such directors allows managers to impose greater agency costs on share- 
holders. 
Directors who are older might pose a last-period risk. Individuals close to re- 
tirement age might seek to maximize their current incomes by accepting exces- 
sive commitments. Alternatively, individuals nearing retirement age might view 
multiple directorships as an interesting and lucrative part-time job for their re- 
tirement years. Either motivation could lead to poor performance in their current 
employment. That poor performance is unlikely to be sanctioned by job termina- 
tion or reductions in salary because of the proximity to retirement. Brickley et al. 
(1999), however, find that the number of board seats held by retiring CEOs is re- 
lated to firm performance prior to their retirement. We find that directors are, on 
average, older for firms with multiple directors, suggesting that the final period 
problem might be an issue. The magnitude of the difference, however, while sta- 
tistically significant, is only one year. 
Equity ownership by the board and executives might align their interests more 
closely with those of shareholders. For example, Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999) 
find that outside directors holding greater equity are more likely to replace the 
6We obtain similar results (untabulated) when we compare firms that have executives who 
are multiple directors with firms lacking an executive who serves on multiple boards. For 
firms with executives who are multiple directors, however, the mean profitability is lower, 
but median profitability is statistically indistinguishable from that for firms without such ex- 
ecutives. We also obtain evidence suggesting that firms with multiple directors enjoy higher 
market-to-book ratios. 
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CEO of a poorly performing company. If directors accept appointments to addi- 
tional boards as a form of perquisite consumption, then we should observe lower 
equity ownership by directors for firms with multiple directors. Equity holding 
directors should be reluctant to accept excessive directorships since impaired 
monitoring would impose direct costs in the form of lower prices for their equity. 
We find that firms with multiple directors have lower overall board ownership, 
as well as lower ownership by outside directors. These findings are consistent 
with the argument that directors view additional board memberships as perqui- 
sites and are deterred from accepting additional directorships when they face 
greater personal costs from such consumption. They are also consistent, however, 
with the view that different directors might bring different skills to the director- 
ship role. Some directors can be good monitors because they have invested their 
own capital in the enterprise, while others are effective monitors because of their 
experience.7 While these differences might reflect agency costs, they might also 
be a statistical artifact: Multiple directors serve on the boards of larger firms, so 
personal wealth constraints might preclude their ability to gain substantial own- 
ership in those firms (especially considering their service on the boards of multi- 
ple firms). 
Lack of monitoring might also be reflected in board size. Yermack (1996) and 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1997) argue that large boards are often unwiel- 
dy, while smaller boards can monitor managers more effectively. Table III docu- 
ments larger board size for firms with multiple directors. This finding supports 
the view that multiple directorships can be a form of perquisite consumption, a 
result consistent with the Busyness Hypothesis. Alternatively, firms with larger 
boards present greater opportunities for board members to make connections 
leading to additional invitations to serve on other boards. If this view is correct, 
directors serving on larger boards are more likely to hold more directorships. As 
with board ownership, however, our findings might simply reflect the fact that 
holding multiple directorships is a large firm phenomenon. 
Finally, less independent boards might reflect agency costs. Boards with a 
greater percentage of outside directors might be able to exercise greater monitor- 
ing and demand more accountability from managers. The relation of indepen- 
dence to performance is not clear. Bhagat and Black (2001) find no correlation 
between board independence and firm performance. 
In sum, our univariate comparisons suggest that multiple directorships are 
generally consistent with our conjectures regarding firm size and profitability. 
But several features of corporate governance for firms with multiple directors 
suggest the presence of agency costs. Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the arguments of the Council of Institutional Investors and other corporate gov- 
ernance activists. These characteristics, however, also relate to firm size and mul- 
tiple directorships are a large firm phenomenon. We explore this tension in 
greater detail in the next sections with a multivariate analysis. 
7We also find (in untabulated results) that executives who are multiple directors hold a 
smaller percentage of equity in their firms than executives who are not multiple directors. 
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IV. The Effect of Firm Performance on the Number of Directorships 
The univariate comparisons for the operating margin and the market-to-book 
ratio discussed in the previous section suggest that there might be a positive re- 
lation between multiple directorships and firm performance. To test whether firm 
performance influences the number of directorships as posited by Fama and Jen- 
sen (1983), we estimate a series of multivariate logistic regressions. These regres- 
sions use director data, thus allowing us to examine the determinants of a 
directorship at the level of individual director. We first examine the influence of 
firm performance on the number of directorships held by the set of all directors in 
our sample. We then separately examine the effect of firm performance on the 
number of directorships held by executives. 
We include a number of control variables that might affect the individual's de- 
sire to serve on more boards and influence the individual's attractiveness as a 
director. Previous firm performance is estimated as the average of the mean op- 
erating margin over the period 1993 through 1995 for all firms with which the 
director was affiliated. For the analysis of executives who are directors, we use 
the mean operating margin over the period 1993 through 1995 for the firm that is 
their full-time employer because this is likely to be the most salient indicator of 
their business acumen. Average ownership in the firms reflects the personal cost 
to the director of having his attentions diluted with the addition of more boards. 
For executives, we use their ownership in the firm that is their full-time employer. 
Age is a proxy for the director's experience as well as the energy that an indivi- 
dual might have for the demands of board service. Surveys report that lack of 
time is the reason most often cited for declining offers of board seats. Average 
firm size is a proxy for the intensity of monitoring required of the director. 
Although larger firms are likely to demand additional effort, they might also 
send a more positive signal of a director's skill as a monitor. For our regressions 
examining the acquisition of additional board appointments, we include the num- 
ber of boards the director sat on in 1994 as a proxy for existing demands on the 
individual's time. 
We present our findings in Table IV. Panel A contains our findings for the de- 
terminants of the total number of directorships held by an individual director8 
while in Panel B we examine what factors determine whether an individual gains 
an additional board appointment. We find evidence consistent with a reputa- 
tional effect in the market for directors. Prior firm performance has a positive 
coefficient and is strongly significant as a determinant of the number of director- 
ships held in both sets of regressions; it is also strongly statistically significant 
for directors receiving new appointments. Overall, these results imply that the 
firm's previous performance influences the number of seats that a director holds 
as well as the likelihood of an appointment to a new board. In aggregate, these 
results indicate that the market for directorships rewards good monitoring inso- 
far as that monitoring can be associated with strong financial performance. 
8All directors holding more than five directorships are coded as holding six for purposes of 
this regression. 
1098 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Mon, 04 May 2015 15:01:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Too Busy to Mind the Business? 1099 
Table IV 
The Effect of Firm Performance on the Number of Directorships 
Panel A reports the results of an ordered logistic regression examining the determinants of the 
number of directorships held by the sample of all directors and separately for executives who 
are directors. If the number of directorships exceeds five, then the number of directorships is set 
to six. Panel B reports the results of a binomial regression in which the dependent variable is 
whether the individual received an additional directorship between 1994 and 1995. Total assets 
are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Operating margin is the firm's operating income 
standardized by total assets. Ownership is equity ownership of the board of directors. For direc- 
tors these variables are the mean for all firms upon whose boards they sit. CEO is defined as the 
executive with the greatest number of directorships (usually the CEO). Operating margin for 
CEO firms is for the firm that is the CEO's full-time employer. CEO ownership is the percent of 
total equity held by the director with the greatest number of directorships, usually the CEO. 
Age is the chronological age of the individual. Current directorships is the number of director- 
ships held by the individual as of 1994. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is 
indicated by * **, and ***, respectively. 
Variable All Directors Executives 
Panel A: Determinants of Directorships 
Intercept 1 -4.810*** -5.461*** 
Intercept 2 - 6.046*** - 6.741 *** 
Intercept 3 - 7.001*** - 7.701*** 
Intercept 4 - 8.077*** - 8.818*** 
Intercept 5 - 8.983*** - 9.960*** 
Log of average total assets95 0.423 ** 
Log of total assets for CEO firm95 - 0.006** 
Average operating margin93_95 1.417 * * * 
Operating margin for CEO firm93-95 0.136*** 
Average director ownership 0 
CEO ownership 0.369*** 
Age 0.008*** 0.049*** 
Panel B: Determinants of Additional Directorships 
Intercept 1.553*** - 18.599 
Log of average total assets95 0.195** 0.201 ** 
Log of total assets for CEO firm95 
Average operating margin93_95 2.967*** 2.041* 
Operating margin for CEO firm93-95 
Average director ownership 0.003 -0.036 
CEO ownership 
Current directorships -1.009*** 16.284 
Age - 0.048*** - 0.030* 
We find that age has a significant positive coefficient in the regression for the 
number of directorships held. Age is significant and negative, however, in Panel 
B's regression for additional directorships, suggesting that older directors (who 
already hold a greater number of directorships) are either less interested in 
additional directorships or less attractive candidates. The number of director- 
ships also has a statistically significant negative coefficient in the directors' re- 
gression for the appointment to new boards, suggesting that firms are reluctant 
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to appoint directors who might overextend themselves (or directors are reluctant 
to accept an additional appointment that can overextend them). Firm size is con- 
sistently positive and statistically significant, reinforcing our earlier finding that 
multiple directorships are a large-firm phenomenon. 
In sum, our results suggest that the previous performance of firms follows di- 
rectors and affects both the number of directorships they currently hold and their 
ability to attract additional board appointments. We interpret such a result as 
consistent with the presence of a reputational effect in the market for directors, 
as posited by Fama and Jensen (1983). Such an effect should serve as a further 
incentive for directors to provide satisfactory monitoring. 
V. Empirical Tests of the Busyness Hypothesis 
The multivariate analysis of Section IV reports a relation between firm perfor- 
mance and the number of directorships an individual subsequently holds. The Bu- 
syness Hypothesis, however, predicts that multiple directorships will lead to 
poorer firm performance in the future because they dilute the quality of manage- 
rial monitoring. 
In this section, we test the Busyness Hypothesis through a series of empirical 
tests. We first examine the relation between multiple directorships and subse- 
quent firm performance in a multivariate framework. We also perform an event 
study of the response to the appointment of a multiple director to a firm's board. 
We then examine whether multiple directors do, in fact, provide a level of moni- 
toring comparable to that of directors holding only one or two board appoint- 
ments by investigating their level of committee service. Finally, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of the monitoring provided by multiple directors by using as a mea- 
sure of director effectiveness the incidence of securities fraud litigation against 
the firm over a three-year sample period. We estimate a logistic regression to de- 
termine whether firms with multiple directors are sued more often than firms 
without multiple directors. 
A. A Multivariate Analysis of Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance 
Several findings from Table III suggest that the presence of multiple director- 
ships might generate higher agency costs: Boards with multiple directors (as well 
as executives who are multiple directors) hold less equity, are larger in size, and 
the directors' average age is slightly older. If these agency costs are significant, 
then reduced monitoring by multiple directors should be reflected in an inverse 
relation between measures of multiple directorships and subsequent firm perfor- 
mance. 
To test this prediction of the Busyness Hypothesis, we regress firm perfor- 
mance in 1997 against a set of independent variables calculated as of 1995. To con- 
trol for the intensity of monitoring required by a director, we include the number 
of external directorships held by the firm's directors in Forbes 500 companies. The 
demands of serving on the board of a Forbes 500 company might be more distract- 
ing than service on the board of a smaller firm. The firm's total assets capture firm 
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size, which simultaneously influences a firm's risk and its observed pattern of re- 
turns. To control for the possibility that a firm's prior success can affect its ability 
to attract prominent directors, we include the ratio of the firm's operating income 
to assets in 1995. Directors who specialize in a given industry might be less dis- 
tracted by the demands of multiple directorships, so we also include an indicator 
variable for firms with an industry director. Equity ownership by the board and 
outside directors partially reflects the cost to individual directors of poor man- 
agerial oversight. Likewise, equity ownership by the CEO reflects the personal 
cost to him or her of the distraction of multiple directorships. Board size and 
percentage of independent directors have previously been found to affect board 
oversight. 
Table V presents the results of our test of the Busyness Hypothesis. We obtain 
positive coefficients for both the number of directorships per director as well as 
the number of directorships held by outside directors. This finding, while not sta- 
tistically significant, is inconsistent with the Busyness Hypothesis, which con- 
tends that the presence of multiple directors harms the firm because of their 
inability to provide adequate monitoring of managerial decision making. The po- 
sitive coefficient for the indicator variable for executives holding multiple direc- 
torships suggests that firms are not harmed by executives with substantial 
external commitments.9 
As a robustness test of this result, we also regress annual changes in our mea- 
sures of multiple directorships against changes in the firm's operating return on 
assets over the two years following the change in the directorships measure. We 
include board size, firm size, and board ownership as control variables in these 
regressions. We fail to find any significant relation between our measures of mul- 
tiple directors and long-term profitability in these regressions, so we do not sepa- 
rately report them. 
B. Event Study of the Effect of an Appointment of a Multiple Director 
In this part, we perform an event study of the announcement of the appoint- 
ment of a multiple director to a firm's board. We construct our sample by using 
the 1995 proxy statements to identify the year that a specific multiple director is 
appointed to a board. We then search the Dow Jones Newswire to identify public 
announcements of the appointment of those multiple directors. We then confirm 
their status as multiple directors at the time of their appointment to the given 
firm's board using director data from Compact Disclosure. This procedure yields 
291 observations of public announcements of the appointment of a multiple direc- 
tor from 1990 to 1995. 
Table VI reports the results from an event study of the announcement of the 
appointment of individuals holding multiple directorships to firms' boards. The 
9 We also perform these regressions using: (1) only the unregulated firms in our sample, (2) 
an indicator variable for regulated firms, and (3) mean return on assets over the period 1993 
to 1995 as a performance measure. We obtain qualitatively identical results for these sets of 
regressions. In addition, we simultaneously estimate firm performance and directorships 
from 1995 data using two-stage least squares regression. We obtain similar results. 
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TableV 
Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance 
Table V presents the results of our regressions between directorships and firm value. The mar- 
ket-to-book ratio is measured as of 1997. Directorships per director is estimated as the total 
number of directorships held across all the directors of a board divided by board size. Director- 
ship per outside director is the mean number of directorships held by the firm's outside direc- 
tors. This number is set to zero if the firm does not have any nonexecutives on its board. 
Directorships per director in Forbes 500 firms is the mean number of directorships in Forbes 
500 firms. CEO is defined as the executive (including the chair) with the greatest number of 
directorships (usually the CEO). A firm has a CEO as a multiple director if any executive holds 
three or more directorships. Directorships held by highest ranking executive in Forbes 500 firms 
is the number of such directorships held by the executive (including the chairman of the board) 
with the greatest number of directorships. Total assets are those reported by Compustat at year- 
end. Operating margin is the firm's operating income standardized by total assets. Industry 
directors are defined as individuals holding three or more directorships, who hold at least 50 
percent of their directorships with the same two-digit SIC code. Board ownership is the aggre- 
gate equity ownership of the firm's officers and directors. Outside board ownership is the aggre- 
gate equity ownership of the firm's outside directors. CEO ownership is the percentage equity 
ownership held by the executive with the largest number of directorships. If executives are tied 
in number of directorships, the ownership of the highest-ranking executive is included. Board 
size is the total number of directors appointed to the firm's board. Percent outside directors 
includes both independent and gray directors divided by the total number of board members. 
The year subscript indicates the year for which the variable is estimated. Statistical signifi- 
cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by * **, and ***, respectively. 
Market-to-Book97 Market-to-Book97 Market-to-Book97 
Intercept 0.676** 0.228 -0.182 
Directorships per director95 0.068 
Directorships per outside director95 0.069 
CEO is a multiple director95 0.122 
Directorships per director in 
Forbes 500 firms95 0.002 ** 0.001 
Directorships held by CEO in 
Forbes 500 firms95 0.104 
Log of total assets94 0.093** 0.147*** 0.106* 
Operating margin95 4.472* * 5.212*** 6.230*** 
Firm has an industry director 0.070 0.267* 
CEO is an industry director 0.285 
Board ownership95 - 0.001 
Outside directors ownership95 0.009* 0.015 ** 
Ownership of CE095 0.000 0.002 
Log of board size95 0.245** 0.130 0.405 
Percent outside directors95 0.004 0.004 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.154 0.157 
Busyness Hypothesis predicts a negative market reaction. We find, however, posi- 
tive (albeit statistically insignificant) returns for the overall sample. We also per- 
form event studies for two subsamples of firms: (1) firms with multiple directors 
adding an additional multiple director to its board, and (2) firms without 
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TableVI 
Event Period Returns of Multiple Directorship Announcements 
Table VI presents the results of an event study for days 0, +1, with day 0 being the date of the 
announcement of the appointment of a multiple director. A director is considered to be a multi- 
ple director if he/she holds three or more directorships in sample firms. Announcements of mul- 
tiple directorship appointments are identified from Dow Jones News Retrieval Service during 
the years 1990 to 1995. For each announcement, we use the directors listed in Compact Disclosure 
prior to the announcement and after the announcement to identify whether directors are being 
replaced, and if so the number of directorships held by the replaced director. If more than one 
director is replaced, we assume that the newly appointed director replaces the director who 
held the most directorships. Statistical significance at the five percent level is indicated by **. 
Announcements of a 
Announcements of an Multiple Director 
Increase in the Appointment When 
All Number of Multiple There are No Multiple 
Announcements Directors Directors on the Board 
Number of firms 291 84 41 
Abnormal return (days 0, +1) 0.2% 0.41% 2.12% 
(t-statistic) (1.17) (1.41) (2.27)** 
multiple directors appointing a multiple director to the board for the first time. 
While we find positive abnormal returns for both subsamples, only the latter is 
statistically significant. These results suggest that market participants do not 
believe that the appointment of directors holding multiple board seats harms 
firm value. 
C. Committee Assignments 
As a more direct examination of the Busyness Hypothesis, Table VII compares 
the participation on board committees by directors holding three or more ap- 
pointments with that of other directors holding only one or two board seats. We 
begin this analysis by randomly selecting 200 Forbes 500 firms and 100 non-Forbes 
500 firms from our original sample and obtain data from their 1995 proxies con- 
cerning the composition of their audit, compensation, executive, nominating, 
and other committees. We elect to construct our subsample in this fashion be- 
cause of the greater incidence of multiple directorships among larger firms. The 
Forbes 500 classification is a convenient manner to create subsamples reflecting 
firm size. We then document the number of meetings that each committee holds 
during a year and identify the chair of each committee. Based upon this data, we 
compare the participation activity by multiple directors in our random sample 
against directors with only one or two appointments as a further test of the quan- 
tity of monitoring provided by multiple directors. 
The findings inTableVII indicate that multiple directors provide more commit- 
tee service than do directors holding only one or two directorships. Multiple di- 
rectors serve on more committees than do single or double directors and attend 
more committee meetings in total. Multiple directors also serve on the 
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TableVII 
Comparative Committee Activity: Multiple versus Single/Double Directors 
From our sample of Compustat firms with at least $100 million in total assets as of fiscal year-end 1994, we randomly select 200 Forbes 500 firms and 
100 non-Forbes 500 firms and obtain committee membership data from their 1995 proxies. Means (medians) of various measures of committee 
activity are estimated for directors holding three or more appointments and those holding only one or two board memberships. Inside directors 
are excluded. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by * **, and ***, respectively. 
Non-Forbes 500 Firms (100 Random Firms) Forbes 500 Firms (200 Random Firms) 
Directors with Directors With 
One or Two Multiple t-test One or Two Multiple t-test 
Directorships Directors Wilcoxon z Directorships Directors Wilcoxon z 
Base retainer 13,895.42 16,201.32 2.76*** 22,795.99 28,031 10.37*** 
Compensation per board meeting 
Compensation per committee meeting 
Total cash compensation 
Number of board meetings 
Number of audit or compensation committee meetings 
Number of audit or compensation committee memberships 
Number of audit or compensation committees chaired 
Number of committee meetings 
Number of committee memberships 
Number of committees chaired 
(15,000) 
917.03 
(1,000) 
713.96 
(700) 
24,282.66 
(23,000) 
7.02 
(6) 
2.85 
(2) 
0.94 
(1) 
0.139 
(0) 
4.22 
(4) 
1.37 
(1) 
0.21 
(0) 
(16,000) (2.50)** 
988.81 1.07 
(1,000) (0.85) 
795.39 1.16 
(775) (1.76)* 
26,971.71 2.19** 
(25,500) (2.47)** 
7.20 0.45 
(7) (0.57) 
3.62 2.44** 
(4) (2.67)*** 
1.18 3.01 * 
(1) (2.85)** 
0.184 0.96 
(0) (1.09) 
4.93 1.75 * 
(4) (2.08)** 
1.68 3.03*** 
(2) (2.80)*** 
0.26 0.97 
(0) (1.21) 
(21,000) 
1059.15 
(1,000) 
900.25 
(1,000) 
37,660.27 
(36,000) 
7.69 
(7) 
3.30 
(3) 
0.83 
(1) 
0.13 
(0) 
5.40 
(5) 
1.39 
(1) 
0.21 
(0) 
(27,000) (11.71)*** 
1,047.29 0.46 
(1,000) (2.07)** -, 
951.32 1.97** 
(1,000) (3.67)*** , 
43,981.26 8.95*** 
(42,000) (9.66)*** s 
8.04 2.49** ? 
(8) (2.18)** 
3.99 4.85*** 
(4) (5.09)*** 
0.95 3.85*** 
(1) (3.92)** 
0.19 3.47*** 
(0) (3.62)*** 
6.44 5.27*** 
(6) (6.38)*** 
1.69 6.79*** 
(2) (6.87)*** 
0.36 6.51 *** 
(0) (6.87)*** 
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important audit and compensation committees with greater frequency and 
attend more of these committee meetings. Finally, we test if multiple directors 
accept leadership roles on these committees by serving as committee chair. We 
find that multiple directors chair more committees, including the audit and com- 
pensation committees, than do single or double directors. 
These findings suggest that firms rely more heavily on multiple directors to 
provide managerial oversight and monitoring through participation on corpo- 
rate governance committees. Not surprisingly, multiple directors receive greater 
compensation, both for committee service and overall. While the available data 
do not allow us to study the relative intensity of effort, we find no evidence of 
shirking by multiple directors. This finding is inconsistent with the predictions 
of the Busyness Hypothesis and the concerns of the Council of Institutional In- 
vestors about inadequate monitoring by directors holding multiple board ap- 
pointments. 
D. Securities Litigation 
The Busyness Hypothesis predicts that directors holding multiple director- 
ships will have insufficient time to monitor the firm's managers, including the ac- 
curacy of their public statements, and, more critically, the firm's financial 
disclosures. An active board is an important backstop for a firm's auditors in 
their efforts to maintain the integrity of corporate financial disclosure. Thus, 
the undersupervised managers of these firms are more likely to make misstate- 
ments about the firm and distort its reported results. Consequently, the Busyness 
Hypothesis implies that the incidence of litigation for securities fraud will be 
higher for those firms whose directors (particularly outside directors) hold multi- 
ple board appointments. 
To test this implication of the Busyness Hypothesis we use the data set pro- 
vided by the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to identify the firms 
in our sample that were sued in such actions during 1996,1997, and 1998.10 This 
produces a sample of 133 sued firms.1 We caution, however, that the Stanford list 
includes all firms sued during those years. The allegations in those complaints 
are untested and the firms sued have not necessarily committed the fraud al- 
leged.We also note that the timing of the complaints is lagged; a securities fraud 
lawsuit filed in 1996 would typically be based on events occurring in 1994 and 
1995. We do not include firms that experienced other types of litigation because 
that litigation can be identified only through the firm's 10-Ks. The SEC only re- 
quires the disclosure of litigation that is material and that determination is 
10http://www.securities.stanford.edu/. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, en- 
acted December 22, 1995, requires plaintiffs filing securities fraud lawsuits to provide public 
notice of the suit at the time of filing. Consequently, data on the number of suits filed after 
1995 is considerably more reliable than for past periods. 
1l Our sample construction excludes firms that are being sued for fraud in connection with 
IPOs because those companies generally would not have been required to report to the SEC 
prior to the public offering. IPO suits raise different legal issues, so their exclusion leaves a 
more homogenous sample. 
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highly fact specific and somewhat subjective. Moreover, the claims most similar 
to securities fraud claims, corporate law derivative claims against officers and 
directors, typically would not be disclosed since the corporation is not a defen- 
dant. In addition to data reliability, the set of securities fraud claims also 
provides the advantage of providing a reasonably homogenous and well-studied 
set of claims against the firm, which allows for use of appropriate control 
variables. 
We construct a control sample of non-sued firms to examine the role that multi- 
ple directorships might play in the likelihood of litigation against the firm. Each 
sued firm is matched randomly with another firm from our sample within its in- 
dustry based on two-digit SIC codes. 
In Panel A of Table VIII, we compare various characteristics of firms facing 
securities fraud lawsuits with the control sample. The differences between the 
samples for our measures of multiple directorships are all statistically insignif- 
icant. Directors holding multiple appointments do not appear to be overrepre- 
sented in the set of firms facing lawsuits. 
In Panel B of Table VIII, we examine the impact of multiple board appoint- 
ments on the likelihood of securities fraud litigation against a firm using a multi- 
variate logistic regression. The Busyness Hypothesis predicts that multiple 
directorships will be positively related to the incidence of fraud because the ac- 
ceptance of additional board appointments overcommits the director. Beasley 
(1996), for instance, reports that the number of directorships held by outside di- 
rectors is positively related to instances of financial statement fraud producing 
SEC enforcement actions. 
We include in the model other board characteristics that control for character- 
istics that might influence the quality of board monitoring. As previously noted, 
larger boards might be unwieldy, making effective monitoring of corporate man- 
agers difficult. We therefore include board size as an independent variable. The 
boards equity ownership is a measure of the incentive that directors have to 
avoid the costs of litigation since as shareholders they suffer a pro rata reduction 
of firm value due to any lawsuit. 
We also include in the specification of our model a number of additional regres- 
sors that reflect critical elements of the firm's financial profile and can affect the 
likelihood that a firm will be sued for securities fraud (Francis, Philbrick, and 
Schipper (1994), Jones and Weingram (1996), and Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard 
(2000)). Total assets reflect the firm's ability to pay a judgment or settlement and 
might correlate with the quality of internal controls. We include two measures of 
the stability of the firm's stock in the period preceding the lawsuit. Share turn- 
over is an element in the calculation of damages for a securities fraud class action 
(and hence, the amount of potential attorneys' fees; Johnson et al.). In addition, 
prior research shows that managers of firms that experience recent performance 
declines might be more likely to commit fraud than those in successful firms (Ar- 
len and Carney, (1992)). At a minimum, such firms are likely targets for plaintiffs' 
attorneys. Accordingly, we include the minimum one-day market-adjusted return 
for the year (250 trading days) prior to suit, as well as the cumulated return for 
that year. The standard deviation of daily returns is included to control for the 
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TableVIII 
Characteristics of Firms Facing Lawsuits 
Table VIII presents results from our comparison of firms from our sample that were sued in securities fraud class actions between 1996 and 1998 
with a matched sample of firms that were not sued. Directorship per outside director is the mean number of directorships held by the outside 
directors of the firm. This number is set to zero if the firm does not have any nonexecutives on the board of directors. Board size is firm's total 
number of directors. Board ownership is the percent of the firm's total outstanding equity held by the firm's directors; outside director ownership is 
percent of total equity held by outside directors. The standard deviation of daily returns is calculated using returns from Day - 370 to Day - 250. 
Share turnover is the volume of shares traded on the firm's shares standardized by the number of shares outstanding (monthly trading volume/ 
shares outstanding at the end of the month is cumulated over a year). Cumulated residuals are the cumulated market-adjusted returns from Day 
- 1 through Day - 250. Minimum stock return is the largest drop in stock price on any particular day during the 250 trading days prior to the 
lawsuit. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. I 
Panel A: Means (Medians) of Selected Firm Characteristics 
Firm Characteristic Firms Facing Lawsuits Control Sample Difference Tests t-statistic (Wilcoxon z) Q 
Directorships per director 1.77 1.75 0.17 
(1.56) (1.57) (0.16) 
Directorships per outside director 1.98 1.86 1.11 
(1.74) (1.67) (0.37) 
Board ownership 13.91 18.82 1.93 * 
(6.33) (8.92) (1.41) 
Outside directors ownership 3.53 6.43 1.40 
(0.38) (0.86) (2.77)*** 
Board size 8.82 9.11 0.64 '~ 
(8) (9) (1.26) 
Percent outside directors 30.70 30.77 0.03 
(27.92) (28.57) (0.07) 
Total assets 6842.78 4127.32 1.13 
(625.80) (628.91) (0.04) 
Cumulated residuals in year - 1 (%) - 26.59 1.42 2.81 *** 
(-47.74) (-16.61) (5.18)*** 
Lowest one-day return in year -1 (%) - 23.39 - 10.61 7.46*** 
(-17.13) ( - 8.26) (6.58)*** 
Standard deviation of daily stock returns 0.029 0.026 1.69 *- 
(0.028) (0.022) (2.13)** - 
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TableVIII -Continued 
Panel A: Means (Medians) of Selected Firm Characteristics 
Firm Characteristic Firms Facing Lawsuits Control Sample Difference Tests t-statistic (Wilcoxon z) 
Share turnover in year -1 ('000s) 3.064 1.946 3.57 * * * 
(2.102) (0.942) (5.04)*** 
Panel B: Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Fraud Litigation 
Variable Model Model 2 
Intercept 
Directorships per director 
Directorships per outside director 
Board size 
Board ownership 
Outside directors ownership 
Log of total assets 
Cumulated residuals in year - 1 
Lowest one-day return in year - 1 
Standard deviation of daily stock returns 
Share turnover in year - 1 ('000s) 
3.68*** 
0.41 
0.01 
0.02 * 
0.24* 
0.12 
- 12.32*** 
- 11.72 
0.08 
-3.47** 
0.69* 
0.04 " 
- 0.04 * o 
0.09 t 
0.15 
-10.60*** * 
- 31.77 
0.17* 
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volatility of the firm's stock price. A large price drop is more likely to provoke 
litigation if the firm's share price is otherwise stable. 
Our results are consistent with our other tests of the Busyness Hypothesis. 
Both the number of directorships per director and the directorships per outside 
director have positive coefficients as predicted by the Busyness Hypothesis, but 
neither is statistically significant. Other measures of multiple directorship (not 
reported) provide similar results. These findings offer little support to the impli- 
cation of the Busyness Hypothesis that inadequate monitoring by multiple direc- 
tors can lead to greater likelihood that the firm will be sued for securities fraud. 
E. Summary of Tests of the Busyness Hypothesis 
In sum, our tests find no correlation between service on multiple boards by a 
director or an executive and lower firm value. This result is inconsistent with the 
predictions of the Busyness Hypothesis that such service will result in ineffec- 
tive board oversight. Our event study results suggest that market participants 
do not view the appointment of a multiple director as a negative event for the 
firm. We find no evidence that multiple directors serve on fewer board commit- 
tees or attend fewer committee meetings than their less-busy counterparts; in 
fact, they sit on more committees and attend more meetings. Finally, we find no 
statistically significant evidence that firms with multiple directors are more vul- 
nerable to securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not sup- 
port the proposition that multiple board memberships harm firm value. 
VI. Conclusion 
This study focuses on one element affecting the quality of monitoring of corpo- 
rate management by directors-the number of directorships held by directors. 
We find that a set of firm and individual characteristics can be used to explain 
the number of external directorships held by an individual, thus providing an 
important insight into the nature of the supply curve for board directors. Direc- 
tors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract 
additional directorships. Multiple directors are usually older and corporate out- 
siders. They most commonly are executives, bankers, or consultants. 
We also find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of board 
seats subsequently held by a director. This finding suggests that reputation mat- 
ters in the market for directors. Specifically, offers of employment as a director 
appear to be conditioned by the quality of previous board service as measured by 
the firm's financial performance. For executives, offers of board membership cor- 
relate with the performance of the firm that they manage. Thus, our results sup- 
port Fama and Jensen's (1983) contention that there is a reputational effect in the 
market for directors. 
We fail to find the negative relation predicted by the Busyness Hypothesis be- 
tween the number of board memberships held by a director and subsequent firm 
performance. Our other tests of the Busyness Hypothesis are consistent with 
these results. Market participants do not react negatively to the appointment of 
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a multiple director. Further, we find no evidence that multiple directors shirk 
their responsibilities to serve on board committees and no statistically signifi- 
cant evidence of a relation between multiple directorships and the likelihood 
that the firm will be named in a securities fraud lawsuit. 
These results undermine arguments by the Council of Institutional Investors 
and other shareholder activists that excessive external commitments by a firm's 
directors can harm firm performance. The evidence presented here does not sup- 
port calls by corporate governance activists for limits on the number of director- 
ships held by any one individual. 
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